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INTRODUCTION
I haven’t time to tell you what emotions we experience in
traversing this half-wild, half-civilized country, in which fifty
years ago were to be found numerous and powerful nations
who have disappeared from the earth, or who have been
pushed back into still more distant forests; a country where
are to be seen, rising with prodigious rapidity, new peoples
and brilliant cities which pitilessly take the place of the un
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happy Indians too feeble to resist them. Half a century ago
the name of the Iroquois, of the Mohawks, their tribes, their
power filled these regions, and now hardly the memory of
them remains. Their majestic forests are falling everyday; civilized nations are established on the ruins . . . .1

A vast and significant body of scholarship, dating back at
least to Adam Smith, has long held secure private property
rights to be a fundamental prerequisite for trade, labor specialization, efficient investments, credit access, liberty, government accountability, growth-promoting economic policies, functioning markets, and a myriad of other engines of economic development.2 Yet, historically, economic development has often
involved the expropriation of land and resources from groups
that are marginalized culturally, racially, ethnically, or socio1. Letter from Gustave de Beaumont to his brother (July 6, 1831), in
GEORGE WILSON PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE IN AMERICA 191 (Oxford Univ. Press
1938) (1830).
2. See generally FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1976);
KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., 4th German ed. 1978)
(1867) [hereinafter MARX, CAPITAL]; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) [hereinafter
INSTITUTIONS]; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF
INEQUALITY AMONG MEN (Franklin Philip trans., 1994) (1754); ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776);
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985);
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967);
Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment:
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century
England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989); Timothy Besley, Property Rights and
Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON.
903 (1995); Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap & Robert Schneider, The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier,
12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 25 (1996); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 THE WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1
(1998); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001)
[hereinafter Colonial Origins]; Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in
Urban Slums, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 279 (2005); Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in
Ghana, 116 J. POL. ECON. 981 (2008); Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak,
Property Rights and Economic Development (London Sch. Econ., STICERD
Research, Working Paper No. EOPP 006, 2009), available at
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/eopp/eopp06.pdf.
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economically, and the reallocation of these resources into the
hands of more politically powerful constituencies with access to
the knowledge and capital necessary for efficient investment.3
Reconciling this apparent contradiction requires recognizing
that whose property rights are secure matters fundamentally
for the political and economic implications of secure property
rights.
Protecting the property rights entitlements of some inherently requires preventing others from claiming and controlling
those same resources.4 “Before ‘property rights’ can be strong or
weak, they must be allocated and defined”5—and the allocation
and enforcement of resource entitlements through legal institutions reflects the distribution of political power.6 But recent
cross-country and comparative research regarding property
3. See generally World Comm’n on Dams, People and Large Dam—Social
Performance, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION
MAKING (2000), http://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdch4.pdf; JAMES A.
YELLING, COMMON FIELD AND ENCLOSURE IN ENGLAND 1450–1850 (1977); see
also PIERSON, supra note 1, 189–96; The Damned: Five Controversial Dams:
Brazil, PBS (Sept. 18, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/thedamned/five-controversial-dams/brazil/3107 [hereinafter PBS].
4. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1090 (1972); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 743, 747 (1917).
5. David W. Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe
for Economic Development 8 (Harv. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working
Paper
No.
09–59,
2010),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/publications/PropertyRightsDe
velopmentOct17Draft.pdf.
6. See JEAN ENSMINGER, MAKING A MARKET: THE INSTITUTIONAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AN AFRICAN SOCIETY 126–28, 142, 148 (1992); GARY D.
LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16–17, 24–27(1989); ITAI SENED,
THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 50, 149– 54 (1997); KATHRYN
FIRMIN-SELLERS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GOLD
COAST: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS APPLYING RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 154
(1996); Lee J. Alston, Edwyna Harris & Bernardo Mueller, De Facto and de
Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian,
Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers 2, 11–14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15264, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15264;
Lee J. Alston et al., Toward an Understanding of Property Rights, in
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 31–33 (Lee J. Alston et al. eds.,
1996); Sumner J. La Croix & James Roumasset, The Evolution of Private
Property in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 829, 845–47 (1999);
Katrina M. Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 129, 141 (2005).
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rights and economic development employs a black-box conception of property rights that effaces the heterogeneity in property rights enjoyment within countries.7 In other words, in this
research, property rights are considered as a one-dimensional
concept, in which rights are assumed to apply uniformly (homogeneously) to all people and entities that are subject to those
laws. No recognition is given to the possibility that different
constituencies may experience the application of the rule of law
differently. Yet as legal scholars have long recognized, law is
not divorced from politics and power, nor is it completely impartial and objective in its application.8 A one-dimensional conception of property rights or “institutional quality”9 more
broadly ignores significant variation in the risk of expropriation faced by different ethnic, cultural, and religious groups in
the same country.

7. See Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1369–70; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 1231, 1262–63 (2002) [hereinafter Geography and Institutions]; Daron
Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949,
957 (2005) [hereinafter Unbundling Institutions]; Valerie Bockstette,
Areendum Chanda & Louis Putterman, States and Markets: The Advantage
of an Early Start, 7 J. ECON. GROWTH 347, 352 (2002); Christopher Clague et.
al., Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and
Economic Performance, 4 J. ECON. GROWTH 185, 188 (1999); Robert E. Hall &
Charles I. Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per
Worker than Others?, 114 Q.J. ECON. 83, 84–85 (1999); Daniel Kaufmann,
Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Governance Matters 1–6 (World Bank
Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2196, 1999) [hereinafter Governance Matters];
Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance:
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. POL.
207, 208 (1995); Danni Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi,
Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131, 135 (2004).
8. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); see also WILLIAM
W. FISHER, III, MORTON J. HORWITZ, & THOMAS REED, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM (1993).
9. “Institutions” is a term of art broadly used in the economics, political
science, and political economy literature to refer to “the rules of the game”
that structure and constrain “human interaction.” See INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 2, at 3. “Institutional quality” is a broad term used to indicate how
“good” or “bad” these institutions are. See generally Kevin E. Davis, Institutions and Economic Development: A Introduction to the Literature (NYU Sch.
Law
Working
Papers,
Paper
No.
202,
2009),
available
at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1206&context=nyu_lewp.
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Using a new set of indicators that measures the property insecurity of ethnocultural minorities, this Article demonstrates
empirically that severe property insecurity for some groups often exists alongside very secure property rights for others. Heterogeneity in property rights enjoyment means that property
rights can simultaneously be strong and secure for some groups
and weak and insecure for other groups. In many countries,
members of marginalized groups face significantly higher property insecurity than the majority, foreign investors, or domestic
elites. The cross-national indices of institutional quality widely
used in the research literature—initially designed to assess the
property security of foreign investors—fail to adequately account for the legal institutions encountered by marginalized
minority groups.
Moreover, this Article demonstrates empirically that the
property rights security or insecurity experienced by marginalized groups is not related to long-run economic development.
Economic growth can still occur when the property rights of the
majority are secure but marginalized minorities face a high
risk of expropriation. In such instances, land is reallocated into
the hands of investors with better access to know-how, capital,
and other complementary production inputs. At the same time,
secure property rights for marginalized minorities are not required for the government accountability that facilitates aggregate growth-enhancing economic policies: security of property
rights for elites can increase accountability of the governing
elites towards other elites with divergent interests, while broad
but not universal property rights security can generate accountability of public officials to the majority while still excluding the minority. Both mechanisms can incentivize the adoption of broadly growth-enhancing economic policies that benefit
the majority but harm some other groups.
These findings have serious implications, opening up questions regarding potential trade-offs between property rights
security for marginalized groups, property rights security for
more politically powerful constituencies, socioeconomic inclusion, and economic growth. On the one hand, if aggregate economic growth is the objective, then policymakers may wish to
ignore (or encourage) the expropriation of land and resources
from marginalized groups, and the reallocation of these resources into the hands of more productive investors or political
constituencies who will advocate for growth enhancing policies.
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On the other hand, if broadly inclusive economic development
that reduces poverty and socioeconomic exclusion in the shortterm is the central goal, then attention must be paid ex ante to
distributional issues in terms of both outcomes and processes.
This is a real and pressing issue today on almost every continent, and in countries as diverse as China, Indonesia, Brazil,
Ecuador, Kenya, and Nigeria. Emerging economies, in particular, may seek to encourage capital inflows by improving the investment climate for foreign direct investment, and to develop
hydropower, oil, arable land, and other natural resources often
located in rural regions to power new industry and feed a growing urban population. The challenge from a policy perspective
arises if there are trade-offs between property rights security
for marginalized groups and aggregate economic growth. Ethnocultural groups with the least power and voice may be left
out by growth-enhancing policies that strengthen the property
rights of those with access to capital and political influence by
weakening the property rights of marginalized groups. This
suggests that a narrow focus on aggregate economic growth—
without specific attention also to political and economic inclusion and the equitable application of the law—may hurt the
most vulnerable.
I. LAW, POWER, AND HETEROGENEITY IN RIGHTS ENJOYMENT
A. The Scope, Allocation, and Enforcement of Property Rights
Some may disagree, but in reality, law is not impartial. In
fact, it reflects the distribution and operation of political power.
Yet recent legal and economics research on the relationship between property rights and economic development implicitly assumes that the laws of a country are applied uniformly to all
without distinction.10 In the cross-national literature in particular, if a state is considered to have a high level of property
rights security and strong protections for property rights, everyone’s rights are taken as equally secure and the country is
categorized as having “good institutions”.11 Likewise, if a state
is considered to have a low level of property rights security and
weak protection for property rights, everyone’s property rights
are viewed as equally insecure and the country is classified as
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra Section II.B.
11. Id.
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having “bad institutions.”12 However, heterogeneity in the rule
of law and disparities in property rights enjoyment between
different groups within the same country have been largely ignored.
Work within institutional economics certainly recognizes that
the “rules of the game” depend on relations of power.13 In the
dialogic between institutional rules and organizational actors,
individuals and organizations operate to maximize their own
interests within a given set of incentives determined by the existing institutional constraints, but then also work to change
these rules to their own benefit. This is the theoretical heart of
the vast body of research that foregrounds the role played by
institutions in long-run economic development.14
However, insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that
not only the form of institutions, but also the scope and application of the rules depend on politics and the distribution of
power. A one-dimensional lens is particularly apt to distort reality in the case of the right to property, which is a zero-sum
game. Protecting the resource claims of some parties requires
preventing others from using those same resources; therefore,
property rights must be defined and allocated before their protection can be strong or weak.15 Given the zero-sum nature of
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA:
THE POLITICAL BASIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 2–3 (1981); North &
Weingast, supra note 2, at 803; INSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 3–10, 107–118;
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 2–4
(2005); Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments,
Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies:
A View from Economic Historians of the United States, in HOW LATIN
AMERICA FELL BEHIND 260 (Stephan Haber ed., 1997) [hereinafter Institutions]; Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies, 3 ECONOMIA
41, 44, 57, 60, 64, 82–83 (2002) [hereinafter Inequality]; Daniel Kaufmann,
Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000-2001 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2772, 2002);
DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP
AND DEMOCRACY (2006); Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Persistence of
Power, Elites and Institutions, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 268, 287 (2008).
14. See, e.g., KEVIN DAVIS, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(2010); Justin Yifu Lin & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Institutions and Economic Development, in HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (J. Behrman & T.N.
Srinivasan eds., 1995).
15. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 8.
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property rights, alongside the role of political power in determining de facto institutional environments, the allocation and
enforcement of resource entitlements is particularly prone to
heterogeneous treatment of groups and claimants.
A property right is relational—it gives the possessor superior
claims to a specific resource against the rest of the world, or
some subset thereof.16 The possessor of a property right asserts
and exercises her rights in relation to other potential claimants; she can simultaneously have superior rights against
some, but inferior rights against others. For example, imagine
a home owner who takes out three mortgages, using his home
as collateral. If he defaults on all three loans, the holder of the
first priority mortgage lien has the right to the value of the
property up until the amount of the lien is satisfied, then the
holder of the second priority lien—who has an inferior right
compared to that of the first lender, but a superior claim to
that of the third lender—has a right to the value of the property used as collateral until the debt is cleared, and so on.17 The
common law rule of “finders keepers” likewise exemplifies the
relational nature of property rights—the “finder” has superior
rights to a found object against everyone except the original
owner who lost the item.18 Clearly, therefore, the allocation and
protection of a secure resource entitlement for one party inherently requires denying an alternative claimant the ability to
control the use of that resource.
Classical political economists recognized the relational nature of property rights and the role played by political power in
defining, allocating, and enforcing claims to resource entitlements. Although Jean-Jacques Rousseau lauded secure private
property rights as a prerequisite for market exchange and a
functioning modern economy,19 he also argued that the enshrinement of property rights in a social contract was, in essence, a grand theft perpetrated by the rich, clever, and strong

16. See Hohfeld, supra note 4, at 743–45, 747; Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 4, at 1089–93.
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.1 cmt. a (1997).
18. See Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B); J.G.
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW §§ 4.04–.05 (2d ed. 2007).
19. Yoav Peled, Rousseau’s Inhibited Radicalism: An Analysis of His Political Thought in Light of His Economic Ideas, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1034,
1036–37, 1043 (1980).
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on the less well-off.20 Having obtained de facto control over land
and resources, Rousseau contended that the de jure protection
of these property rights claims protected and perpetuated the
tenuous and previously contested position of elites.21 Additionally, Karl Marx argued that the private property relations that
form the legal superstructure of capitalism entrench the already powerful:22 in this view, private property enables capital
accumulation, leading to ever increasing inequality and putting
the owners of the means of production in an advantaged bargaining position vis-à-vis wage laborers, which allows the owners of capital to capture all surplus value.
Moreover, the role of political power in determining the
scope, allocation, and enforcement of property rights is readily
apparent both historically and in the modern administrative
state.23 The multiplicity of potential property rights that may
or may not be recognized and protected by de jure and de facto
legal institutions also contributes to heterogeneity in the enjoyment of secure property rights. Property rights are widely
understood by legal scholars as a “bundle of sticks”, with each
stick in the bundle representing a right or a privilege.24 For example, the English case of Sturges v. Bridgman—upon which
Ronald Coase based his famous The Problem of Social Cost25—
addressed whether a physician had the right to stop his nextdoor neighbor, a confectioner, from operating his mortars to
grind sugar.26 The question is whether, in the bundle of sticks
that constituted property ownership, the doctor had the right to
enjoy silence so that he could see his patients undisturbed, or
whether the confectioner had the right to produce sugar in his
factory. Coase argued that inefficiency results when neither
right is clearly defined, thereby preventing bargaining;27 here

20. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 55–67.
21. Id. at 55–84.
22. See MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 831–58; Karl Marx, Economic &
Philosophic Manuscripts, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER (R. Tucker ed., 1978)
(1844).
23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24. Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss, Introduction to PROPERTY
STORIES 1 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009); Kennedy, supra note 5, at 26.
25. Coase, supra note 2, at 8–10.
26. Sturges v. Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch.D. 852 (Eng.).
27. See generally Coase, supra note 2.
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the first-order problem is clearly not in making the property
right secure, but in defining and allocating it in the first place.
The wide diversity of rights that may be enjoyed as part of a
bundle of property rights is evident in many low and middle
income countries. Throughout Africa, for example, “one user
might have the right to sow and harvest, another to collect fruit
from trees on the land, and a third to bring in livestock to feed
on crop residues after the harvest.”28 In southeast Nigeria and
southern Mali, the village leaders allocate farming land to family heads based on need but retain reversionary rights to the
land as trustees on behalf of the group, while individuals have
enduring rights to any physical structures they build and to
any trees they plant. This means that one family could have
temporary use rights to the soil while the son of the person who
planted nut trees on the land the generation prior has the right
to gather the nuts.29 In the north-central flood plains of the Niger Delta, where herding, farming, and fishing coexist and are
practiced by different ethnic groups, herders have the right to
use given land for pasture during the off-season, while farmers
use this same land to grow crops during a different part of the
year.30 When some kinds of rights—some of the “sticks in the
bundle”—are protected by property rights institutions, but others are not, the groups whose members enjoy the protected
kinds of rights benefit, while those with unprotected rights lose
out.
If private freehold titles are protected, but various usufruct
rights such as hunting, fishing, grazing cattle, and gathering
berries are not, then the parties best positioned to claim private freehold ownership benefit while others lose access to formerly shared resources. Because property rights can be understood as a bundle of sticks, when different groups lay claim to
28. Tor A. Benjaminsen, Formalising Land Tenure in Rural Africa, 2
NORWEGIAN INST. OF INT’L AFF. 362 (2002); JOHN W. BRUCE, COUNTRY
PROFILES OF LAND TENURE: AFRICA 266–70 (1996); Rohini Pande & Christopher Udry, Institutions and Development: A View From Below, in ADVANCES
IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 345, 377 (Richard Blundell et al. eds., 2006).
29. See Benjaminsen, supra note 40, at 362; Karol C. Boudreaux, The Human Face of Resource Conflict: Property and Power in Nigeria, 7 SAN DIEGO
INT’L L.J. 61, 71–76 (2005).
30. See generally id. See also Peter A. Dewees, Trees and Farm Boundaries: Farm Forestry, Land Tenure and Reform in Kenya, Africa, 65 AFR: J.
INT’L AFR. INST. 217, 220–21 (1995).
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different kinds of sticks, the recognition and protection of some
rights, but not others, in the bundle creates heterogeneity in
property rights security. Therefore, the scope of application of
property rights protection can engender heterogeneity in the
security of property rights enjoyment.
Due to the relational, zero-sum nature of property rights, as
well as the complexity and multidimensionality of the bundle of
rights that constitute property interests, we should expect that
the role played by political power in determining the institutional rules of the game will often lead to heterogeneity between groups within countries in the enjoyment of property
rights security—yet this is not the baseline assumption of
much of the “institutions and economic development” research
literature.31
B. Measuring Property Rights Security: One-Dimensional Indices in the Research Literature
Cross-country comparative research—which aims to explain
aggregate growth or other development outcomes with reference to institutional conditions for an entire country-unit—is
particularly susceptible to the eliding of property rights’ inherent complexity. Recent “institutions and development” research
has often unwittingly adopted a legal positivist approach, in
which law is seen as inherently impartial in its application.32
Heterogeneity in the scope and application of de facto institutions is effaced by this simplistic, legal positivist framework. 33
This section examines the cross-country indices of institutional quality most widely used in the research literature, revealing that due to vantage point bias and methodology of construction, scores on these indices fail to adequately reflect the
legal institutions encountered by marginalized minority
groups. The focus is on indicators which have been widely influential: the International Country Risk Guide (“ICRG”), the
Heritage Foundation’s property rights index, and the World
31. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B.
32. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 1 (2007).
33. In contrast, legal realists have long sought to penetrate beyond stated
rules and norms to understand how the law operates in action, highlighting
the difference between the “law on the books” and “law in action”. See, e.g.,
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein,
The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).

156

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:1

Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. The ICRG, a component of Political Risk Services (“PRS”), was first created in
1980 by the editors of a weekly newsletter on international finance and economics called International Reports.34 The ICRG
risk ratings system has twenty-two components grouped into
three major categories of risk: political, financial, and economic. Each component is assigned a numerical value, with the
highest number of points indicating the lowest risk. ICRG
scores are based on a subjective assessment by experts employed by PRS. The property rights index evaluates the risk of
“outright confiscation and forced nationalization of property;”
lower ratings are assigned to “countries where expropriation of
private foreign investment is a likely event.”35
The initial purpose of the ICRG was to “meet the needs of clients for an in-depth and exhaustively researched analysis of
the potential risks to international business operations.”36 According to PRS, the primary users and consumers of the ICRG
ratings data are “institutional investors, banks, multinational
corporations, importers, exporters, and foreign exchange traders,” who use the ICRG model to “determine how financial,
economic, and political risk might affect their business and investments now and in the future.”37
Given that the intended customers of the ICRG are investors,
multinational corporations, importers, and exporters, it is only
logical that the ranking system would be targeted to reflect the
investment risks posed to these kinds of customers. In other
words, the information on expropriation risk, by its very design, is meant to reflect the risk posed to the enterprises of the
large and often multinational businesses that are purchasing
the ICRG data, not the average citizen of a country—and even
less the property rights of marginalized ethnocultural minority
groups, who are clearly not purchasing the ICRG data. This
intentional evaluation of risk from the standpoint of foreign
investors and domestic elites is reinforced by the source of the
data—expert evaluations—as financial and business experts
34. International Country Risk Guide Methodology, POLITICAL RISK SERV.
GRP., http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx (last visited Nov. 9,
2012).
35. IRIS-3 File of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data, IRIS
CTR., http://weber.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/IRIS_doc.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
36. International Country Risk Guide Methodology, supra note 51.
37. Id.
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are likely to be more familiar with threats posed to international capital than to poor local resource users.38
This property rights index from ICRG has been widely used
in cross-country research as a proxy for “institutional quality”
in a general sense, and for the security of property rights more
specifically. For example, in their well-known and widely-cited
article examining the relationship between institutions and
long-run growth, Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer used a rescaled version of the ICRG index score to measure “institutional quality.”39 The frequently cited work of Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, in which settler mortality is used as an instrumental variable for institutions, also
relies upon the ICRG risk of expropriation index as a proxy for
institutional quality.40 The ICRG index is pervasive as well in
the cross-country research on the relationship among natural
resource abundance, institutions, growth, and conflict.41
A number of other indices also attempt to quantitatively
measure property rights across countries. Most prominently,
the Heritage Foundation scores “the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to
which its government enforces those laws.”42 The Heritage
Foundation’s property rights indicator is expansive, addressing: “the likelihood that private property will be expropriated[,]
. . . the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and
businesses to enforce contracts.”43 Like the ICRG index, the
less certain the legal protection of property, the lower a country’s score. For example, a country receives 100% if “private
property is guaranteed by the government[,] [t]he court system
38. Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule
of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141, 148–49, 150–51 (2004).
39. Knack & Keefer, supra note 7, at 210, 212.
40. See Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1370–71; Geography and Institutions, supra note 7, at 1266; see also infra Part I.C.
41. See Anne D. Boschini, Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, Resource Curse
or Not: A Question of Appropriability, 109 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 593, 601,
612 (2007); Simeon Djankov and Marta Reynal-Querol, Poverty and Civil
Wars: Revisiting the Evidence, 92 REV. ECON. STAT. 1035, 1037–1041 (2010);
Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, Institutions and the Resource
Curse, 116 ECON. J. 1, 13–14 (2006).
42. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2012 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 455 (2012),
available at http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/Index09_Methodology.pdf.
43. Id.
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enforces contracts efficiently and quickly[, and] [t]he justice
system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property.”44 At the other extreme, a country receives a score of 0%
when “private property is outlawed, and all property belongs to
the state.”45 The index is a subjective score, based on information gleaned from the following sources, in order of the following priority: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce; U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial
Guide; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices; and U.S. Department of State, Investment
Climate Statements.46 Once again, all these sources except for
the U.S. State Department Reports have as their primary audience large commercial investors interested in assessing the
investment risks posed to their business ventures. Moreover,
countries receive high scores only for securely protecting private property rights. Secure protection of the communal property rights of ethnocultural minorities is not considered by the
index. This is a significant shortcoming, given that throughout
Africa, Latin America, Asia, North America, and Europe, over
300 million members of indigenous groups hold land communally in accordance with customary law.47
The World Bank’s widely used Worldwide Governance Indicators (“WGI”), initially developed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart
Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton,48 incorporate the Heritage
Foundation’s property security measure as well as the property
rights measure from ICRG. The WGI consists of aggregate indices corresponding to six basic governance concepts: (1) Voice
& Accountability; (2) Political Instability & Violence; (3) Government Effectiveness; (4) Regulatory Burden; (5) Rule of Law;
and (6) Graft. These aggregate indices are based on governance
indicators taken from thirty-five data sources—including both

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE–PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 1, 3–5 (2004) (by Rodolfo Stavenhagen),
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/papers/HDR2004_Rodolfo_Stav
enhagen.pdf; Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues,
Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, at 1,
51–57, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328 (Dec. 2009).
48. Governance Matters, supra note 7, at 21.
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the ICRG and the Heritage Foundation Index.49 It would be difficult to overstate the reach and influence of the WGI as a research tool in cross-country analysis. The most recent Governance Matters publication50 ranks as one of the top fifty downloads on the Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”).51
C. A New Index: Measuring the Property Insecurity of Marginalized Groups
This Article presents an alternative Property Insecurity Index, specifically designed to evaluate the security of property
rights enjoyed or not enjoyed by marginalized groups, rather
than foreign investors and domestic elites. The Property Insecurity Index is a composite measure of the property insecurity
experienced by each minority group in every country included
in the Minorities at Risk (“MAR”) database.52 The MAR database assesses the political and economic exclusion of ethnocultural minorities in every country with a population of at least
500,000.53 Experts assign a numerical score indicating the severity of exclusion to each group along an array of political,
economic, social, and cultural dimensions. A “minority at risk”
is defined as “an ethnopolitical group (non-state communal
group) that collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic
discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society;
and/or collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its selfdefined interests.”54 The following four variables identify the
factors present in the group which make it a minority at risk:
(1) the group is subject to discrimination at present; (2) the
group is disadvantaged due to past discrimination; (3) the
group is an advantaged minority; and (4) the group supports
49. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2008 7, 29
(World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 4978, 2009).
50. Id.
51. SSRN Top 10,000 Papers, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK,
http://hq.ssrn.com/rankings/Ranking_display.cfm?TRN_gID=10&requesttime
out=900 (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
52. The MAR database was developed and is maintained by the University
of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management. CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. AND CONFLICT MGMT., MINORITIES AT RISK (MAR)
CODEBOOK VERSION 2/2009 at 1 (2009), available at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Id.

160

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:1

political organizations advocating greater group rights. Groups
are included in the MAR database if the group has a population
larger than 100,000 or greater than 1% of a country’s population.55
The property insecurity score for the Property Insecurity Index for each group is based on MAR scores in three dimensions:
dispossession from land, forced internal resettlement, and internal resettlement by policy. Like the ICRG and Heritage
Foundation indices, the Property Insecurity Index measures the
de facto, rather than de jure, protection from expropriation experienced by ethnocultural minority groups. The index detects
state failure to protect the property rights of minority groups
from incursions by other (possibly more powerful and influential) private actors, as well as direct state acts of expropriation.
Country Property Insecurity scores are generated by aggregating the property insecurity scores of all minority groups within
each country.
There are three versions of the Property Insecurity Index. The
first, Property Insecurity (Weighted), is a sum of group property
insecurities weighted by the group’s proportional representation within a country’s population. The second, Property Insecurity (Max), reflects the property insecurity of the worst-off
group in a country. The third, Property Insecurity (Mean) reflects the average property insecurity score of minority groups
within a country. All three versions are compared to the ICRG
and Heritage Foundation Indices in Part I.D below. Property
Insecurity (Max) is then used in Part II to examine the relation
between property insecurity for marginalized groups and longrun economic development, because Property Insecurity (Max)
best captures the most severe property insecurity faced by any
group in a country.

55. Id. at 1-2.
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Property Insecurity for Group G = Pg = (evictiong +
forced_resettleg + resettle_policyg)/3
Property Insecurity for Country I (Weighted) = Σ(gprog)Pg
Property Insecurity for Country I (Max) = Pworst
Property Insecurity for Country I (Mean) = Average(Pg)

Where gprog = group’s proportion of the population, evictiong
= dispossession from land, forced_resettleg = forced internal resettlement, and resettle_policyg = internal resettlement by policy.
This Property Insecurity Index departs fundamentally from
other measures of property rights security and institutional
quality in two ways. First, it relies on data sources that assess
the experience of the worst-off populations in a country—
precisely those groups that are supposedly the intended targets
of economic development initiatives. Second, it explicitly aims
to capture and aggregate the experience of many groups within
a single country, rather than attempting to present an overall
country measure of the average level of institutional quality
supposedly experienced by everyone. In this sense, the conceptual starting point of the Property Insecurity measure is that a
single indicator of property rights (or “institutional quality”
more broadly) may potentially efface heterogeneity in rights
enjoyment; an index that measures only averages, or the situation of elites, or both, inherently cannot detect variations in the
experiences of different groups.
D. Empirical Evidence of Heterogeneity in Property Rights Security
The basic question of whether or not aggregate cross-country
indices of property rights security reflect the property rights
enjoyed by marginalized minorities can be answered empirically by examining the degree to which widely used measures of
property rights institutions correlate with the level of property
insecurity faced by ethnocultural minority groups. If property
rights are homogeneous within countries, as implicitly assumed in much of the cross-country institutions and economic
development research, then all measures of property rights security would be highly correlated—with any correlation less
than one reflecting only the measurement error generated by
the assignation of scores through subjective evaluation. The
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ICRG index and the Heritage Foundation index would therefore be highly and positively correlated with each other, and
both would be inversely related to the Property Insecurity Index. If instead property rights are indeed enjoyed heterogeneously by different groups within the same country, but the aggregate property rights indices are still reflecting the rights
enjoyed by ethnocultural minorities—as opposed to simply
measuring the rights enjoyment of foreign investors and domestic elites—then the ICRG and the Heritage Foundation
Property Rights indices should be highly and inversely related
to the Property Insecurity Index (Weighted), and weakly and
inversely related to the Property Insecurity Index (Mean).
The empirical evidence reveals both that (a) property rights
enjoyment is indeed heterogeneous between groups within
countries, and (b) existing widely used cross-country indices of
property rights fail to adequately consider the property rights
security enjoyed by marginalized minorities. Although the Heritage Foundation and the ICRG measures indeed correspond
highly with each other, neither is related to our new indicators
that measure the property insecurity experienced by marginalized groups. Results are below in Tables 2 and 3, which show
Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients for the different property
rights measures. The data availability for the Heritage Foundation and the ICRG measure differ, so Table 2 takes the years
available for the ICRG Index as the baseline dataset, while Table 3 takes the years available for the Heritage Foundation Index as the baseline dataset. Descriptive statistics are displayed
in Table 1.
Kendall’s coefficient is the appropriate measure of correlation
because the data is not normally distributed—the Heritage
Foundation and ICRG measures are left-skewed, while the
Property Insecurity Index has a large number of zero value observations and is therefore right-skewed. Unlike Pearson’s correlation coefficient, the Kendall coefficient does not assume
normality.56 And unlike Spearman’s coefficient, Kendall’s coef56. Correlation measures the relationship between variables. The widely
used Pearson product moment correlation reflects the degree of linear relationship between two variables, and is calculated assuming that the variables
are continuous and normally distributed, there are few or no outliers, and
any relationship is linear. The Spearman’s correlation is the nonparametric
version of the Pearson correlation, and can be used when the assumptions
required for the Pearson test are violated, such as for ordinal and rank-
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ficient is robust to “ties”, i.e., identical values for different observations, which are prevalent in this data set.
The correlation between the two aggregate measures of property rights security—the ICRG and Heritage Foundation Indices—is very high, regardless of the time period. Yet there is no
statistical relationship whatsoever between the property insecurity of marginalized minorities and the ICRG or Heritage
Foundation measures. The scatter plot graphs following the
correlation tables further illustrate that the lack of any significant correlation between standard property rights measures
and the new Property Insecurity indices is not an artifact of
some nonlinear relation; there simply is no relation.

ordered variables, and when the underlying data is not normally distributed
or there is a monotonic but non-linear relationship between variables. The
Kendall correlation coefficient is a different non-parametric test that
measures rank correlations, which is robust to ties and penalizes lack of correspondence by distance of dislocation rather than square of the distance.
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7.30
(0.07)
7.54
(0.08)
0.55
(0.02)
0.59
(0.02)
6.00
(0.17)
39.50

(3)

(4)

(2)

9.45
(0.07)
9.74
(0.07)
0.84
(0.01)
0.86
(0.01)
8.18
(0.18)
63.23

(1)

Log GDP per capita
(PPP) in 1995

8.37
(1.27)
8.64
(1.30)
0.69
(0.18)
0.73
(0.18)
7.06
(1.85)
50.76

Oceania

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Whole World High Income Low Income

164
[Vol. 38:1

2012]

PROPERTY INSECURITY

165

Table 2. Correlations: 1985-1995
ICRG
Property
Rights,
1985-1995

Correlation
ICRG Property
Rights, 1985-1995
N
Heritage
Foundation
Property Rights,
1995-2004
Property
Insecurity
Weighted, 19851995
Property
Insecurity Mean,
1985-1995
Property
Insecurity Max,
1985-1995

Correlation
N
Correlation
N
Correlation
N
Correlation
N

Heritage
Foundation
Property
Rights,
1995-2004

Property
Insecurity
Weighted,
1985-1995

Property
Insecurity
Mean,
1985-1995

Property
Insecurity
Max,
1985-1995

1
83
0.517*

1

83

83

-0.142

-0.043

1

83

83

83

-0.108

-0.083

0.582*

1

83

83

83

83

-0.116

-0.132

0.566*

0.801*

1

83

83

83

83

83

Notes: ‘Property Insecurity Weighted’ is the sum of group property insecurity scores, weighted by their proportion
of the population; ‘Property Insecurity Maximum’ is the property insecurity score of the worst off group; ‘Property
Insecurity Mean’ is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores. * represents significance at the
5% level.

Table 3. Correlations: 1995-2004
Heritage
Foundation
Property
Rights,
1995-2004
Heritage
Foundation
Property Rights,
1995-2004

Correlation

1

N

89

Correlation
ICRG Property
Rights, 1985-1995
N
Property
Insecurity
Weighted, 19952003
Property
Insecurity Mean,
1995-2003
Property
Insecurity Max,
1995-2003

Correlation
N
Correlation
N
Correlation
N

ICRG
Property
Rights,
1985-1995

Property
Insecurity
Weighted,
1995-2003

Property
Insecurity
Mean,
1995-2003

Property
Insecurity
Max,
1995-2003

0.526*

1

89

89

-0.023

-0.068

1

89

89

89

-0.143

-0.098

0.662*

1

89

89

89

89

-0.161*

-0.087

0.680*

0.880*

1

89

89

89

89

89

Notes: ‘Property Insecurity Weighted’ is the sum of group property insecurity scores, weighted by their proportion
of the population; ‘Property Insecurity Maximum’ is the property insecurity score of the worst off group; ‘Property
Insecurity Mean’ is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores. * represents significance at the
5% level. Phase IV release of the MAR dataset includes data from 1945-2003.
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II. PROPERTY RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. Micro and Macro Theories: Why It Matters Whose Property
Rights Are Secure
There is an extraordinarily large and diverse body of research
regarding the relationship between property rights and economic development. Most social scientists—from classical political economists to contemporary legal scholars and new institutional economists—argue that secure property rights are a necessary prerequisite for economic development.57 However, implicit and unstated in most of these theories is that it fundamentally matters whose property rights are secure. From a neoclassical and new institutional “micro” perspective, only secure
property rights for those with skills, knowledge, and capital
lead to economic growth. From a political economy and new institutional “macro” viewpoint, only secure property rights for
those who will use their political voice to agitate for growth enhancing economic policies are related to long-run development.
At a micro level, secure property rights are thought to generate economic growth for three reasons. First, secure property
rights internalize externalities, thereby incentivizing efficient
levels of investment and ensuring that a resource is neither
over- nor under-utilized.58 Second, clear allocation and enforcement of resource entitlements can generate efficiency
gains by reducing transaction costs in exchanges between parties and allowing reallocation to more efficient users.59 Third,
secure private property rights may facilitate access to credit
and the conversion of dead assets into investment capital because the underlying asset can serve as collateral, making re-

57. See VON HAYEK, supra note 2, at 112–16; MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 2,
at 59–69; INSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 33–35, 51–52, 110, 121; WILLIAMSON,
supra note 2, at 26–29; Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1369, 1373; Alston,
Libecap, & Schneider, supra note 2, at 58, 59; Besley & Ghatak, supra note 2,
at 5, 10, 26; North & Weingast, supra note 2; Posner, supra note 2, at 3–5;
ROUSSEAU, supra note 2, at 55–84; SMITH, supra note 2; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi supra note 7, at 132.
58. See Demsetz, supra note 2, at 348; Besley, supra note 2, at 905–07,
916; Field, supra note 2, at 286–89; Goldstein & Udry, supra note 2, at 981–
84.
59. See Coase, supra note 2, at 19; Besley & Ghatak, supra note 2, at 17–
18.

168

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:1

payment commitments more enforceable.60 Markets, credit access, and efficient resource use drive economic growth by enabling specialization and gains from trade, providing capital for
reinvestment, and increasing productivity.
At the core of these micro-theories of property rights and economic development is an implicit assumption that what actually matters is property rights security for those with access to
complementary production inputs, i.e., skills, knowledge, or
capital. Appropriate know-how or access to capital is obviously
implicit in the internalization of costs and benefits, which is
the basis for secure private property rights. Efficient levels of
investment and resource utilization can only occur when the
owner has the necessary complementary production inputs.61
Likewise, a growth-enhancing reallocation of resource entitlements into the hands of more efficient users will not occur—
even and especially with secure private property rights—when
the existence of multiple owners creates a hold-out problem,62
or when owners place an idiosyncratic, non-economic value on a
property.63 And when property rights are secure but nonalienable, as is the case with forests, pastures, and fisheries
held collectively according to indigenous customary tenure
law,64 greater property rights security for customary resource
holders will actually prevent reallocation through voluntary
market exchange. Therefore, secure property rights for owners
who lack the skills or capital to invest efficiently in a resource
but who also will not or cannot bargain for some reason65 may
actually prevent a more economically efficient allocation of resources and impede growth. The credit access theory explicitly
recognizes the relationship between property rights, access to
capital, and growth; if the poor are credit constrained for exog60. See DE SOTO, supra note 2, at 63–65; Eric Field & Maximo Torero, Do
Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from
a Nationwide Titling Program 1, 24–25 (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/field/files/FieldTorerocs.pdf.
61. Besley & Ghatak, supra note 2, at 26–34.
62. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 674 (1998).
63. Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 986
(1982).
64. BRUCE, supra note 40.
65. Id.; Heller, supra note 107, at 673–74; Radin, supra note 108, at 987;
SENED, supra note 6, at 76.
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enous reasons such as ethnic discrimination,66 or actually face
savings rather than credit constraints,67 then making property
rights more secure will not “unlock” hidden capital.
At a macro level, a number of Western political theorists
have argued that secure private property rights engender political accountability, which in turn leads to economic policies
that are broadly growth-enhancing, rather than narrowly beneficial to only powerful, rent-seeking elites.68 According to this
view, private property is an essential pillar in the protection of
individual liberty. The individual economic security that private property provides is thought to act as a safeguard against
the potentially totalitarian power of the state, and individuals
are much more likely to actively oppose government policies
when they know their livelihoods are not at risk.69 The resulting political accountability to a broad cross-section of the population encourages governments to implement economic policies
that benefit society as a whole, such as investments in education, roads, and other public goods.70
Relatedly, some contend that the failure of political interest
groups to implement the most effective growth promoting policies and then use political power to bargain over distribution
results from a commitment problem, which stems from weak
property rights.71 Since political power is in part a result of
66. John V. Duca & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Borrowing Constraints, Household Debt, and Racial Discrimination in Loan Markets 15–16 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Dall., Research Paper No. 9312, 1993), available at
http://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/papers/1993/wp9312.pdf.
67. Pascaline Dupas & Jonathan Robinson, Savings Constraints and Microenterprise Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya 16
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14693, 2009), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14693; Jonathan M. Morduch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1569, 1609 (1999).
68. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL (2012); see
generally Colonial Origins, supra note 2; Institutions, supra note 13; Inequality, supra note 13.
69. VON HAYEK, supra note 2, at 115.
70. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 71, at 456–57; Stanley L.
Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Colonialism, Inequality, and Long-Run
Paths of Development 15–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 11057, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11057.pdf; Inequality, supra note 21, at 75–76; Institutions, supra note 21.
71. See generally Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson,
Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in 1A HANDBOOK
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH VOLUME 385, 387 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N.
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economic power, political groups who benefit relatively less
from growth enhancing economic policies and foresee that their
relative economic position will decline and thus their relative
political strength as well, will resist pie-maximizing economic
policies that hurt their relative economic positions—in fear
that newly ascendant political-economic elites will change the
rules of the game.72 Strong protections against government expropriation theoretically allow the commitment problem to be
overcome by ensuring that those who gain in relative economic
strength will not use their new political power to seize the assets of those who gain less from pie-maximizing growth policies. Other researchers and theorists strongly disagree, contending that private property reinforces, rather than constrains, the power of elites, because it is precisely the institution of private property that puts the owners of capital inputs
in an advantaged bargaining position vis-à-vis labor. In this
view, private property relations facilitate the increasing concentration of economic capital and corresponding political power, rather than serving as a check on government authority.73
A far more nuanced understanding of the role played by secure property rights in generating government accountability
and constraining the power of elites is required. Elites are not
a single monolithic group—different groups of elites have different interests and compete amongst themselves for power.74
Security of property rights for elites can therefore increase accountability of the governing elites towards other elites with
divergent interests,75 incentivizing the adoption of broadly beneficial economic policies. Likewise, accountability of public officials to the majority, facilitated by broad but not universal
property rights security, may incentivize growth-enhancing
Durlauf eds., 2005); see also Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 620, 620
(2003), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/4461.
72. Id. at 621, 623.
73. See VIVEK CHIBBER, LOCKED IN PLACE 59–61 (2003); Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND
SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17, 18–19 (Douglas Hay et al. eds.,
1975); MARX, CAPITAL supra note 2; Marx, supra note 33.
74. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN
AMERICAN STATES 22–23, 25–26 (2002).
75. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 82, 196 (1962).
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economic policies that benefit the majority even while hurting
some groups. Seen in this light, secure property rights for marginalized minorities are not required for the kind of government accountability that leads to aggregate, growth-enhancing
economic policies. Once again, whose property rights are secure
matters.
B. Empirical Econometric Findings
This section empirically tests whether the political and economic implications of secure property rights indeed do depend
on whose property rights are secure, demonstrating that security of property rights for marginalized minorities is irrelevant
for long-run economic development. First, the core empirical
strategy is explained. Second, the results and findings are presented and discussed. Third, two alternative econometric models are employed as a robustness check to confirm the validity
of the results.
A generalized least squares (“GLS”) model with bootstrapped
standard errors is used to regress log per capita income on the
indices of property rights from ICRG, Heritage Foundation,
and the new measures of Property Insecurity. Results are reported in Table 4. Bootstrapping entails estimating the sampling distribution by sampling with replacement from the original data, and allows hypothesis testing based on the empirical
population distribution even when data is nonparametric and
violates common assumptions regarding continuity or parametric families.76 The nonparametric approach of bootstrapped
standard errors was adopted because the empirical distribution
of the primary variable of interest—Property Insecurity—does
not meet parametric assumptions, and there is no a priori theoretical reason to assume any particular asymptotic population
distribution. Therefore, in order to accurately assess statistical
significance, a technique that is applicable regardless of the
form of the data’s probability density function had to be utilized. The results in Table 4 are based on resampling with replacement 1000 times.
The linear regressions are for the GLS equation:
log yi = α + βPi + µXi + єi

(1)

76. BRADLEY EFRON & ROBERT J. TIBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION
BOOTSTRAP 5, 47 (1993).
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where yi is GDP per capita in country i, Pi is the property rights
measure, Xi is a vector of covariates, and єi is the random error
term. The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect
of property security and insecurity on per capita income. An
alternative specification, where the outcome of interest is the
composite Human Development Index (“HDI”) from the UNDP
Human Development Reports Office, is also examined. The
HDI is an average of life expectancy, literacy rates plus gross
school enrollment, and log per capita income.77
The Property Insecurity scores are the average from 1985 to
2003, the most recent time period for which MAR data was
available for group dispossession from land, forced internal resettlement, and internal resettlement by policy. The ICRG
Property Rights index is the average for 1985 to 1995, the most
recent time period available and the data widely used in previous studies.78 Heritage Foundation Property Rights scores are
the average for the ten year period beginning in 1995, the first
year for which data became available.79 All dependent variables
are for 2005 to mitigate the possibility of reverse causality. Regional dummies are based on classifications from the United
Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”).80 This approach
was adopted because “[t]he conventional choice for regional
dummies—the World Bank’s regional classifications—is endogenous” as the World Bank “regions themselves are defined on
the basis of per capita income.”81

77. Human Development Index (HDI), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
78. See, e.g., Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1378; Geography and Institutions, supra note 7, at 1266; Boschini, Pettersson & Roine, supra note 63, at
600; Djankov & Reynal-Querol, supra note 63; Knack & Keefer, supra, note 7,
at 217; Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, supra note 63, at 13.
79. See 2012 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (showing that there is no data pre-1995).
80. See
United
Nations
Dev.
Programme,
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012)
(The list of countries within each regional bureau is available after accessing
the link of that bureau office.).
81. William Easterly, Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights
From a New Instrument, 84 J. DEV. ECON. 755, 765 (2007).
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Table 4. Large Sample: Cross-Sectional GLS Regressions of Long-Run Development
Dependent Variable: Log per capita GDP, 2005
(1)
Property Rights (ICRG),
1985-1995

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Property Rights (Heritage
Foundation), 1995-2004

Europe dummy
Oceania dummy
2

R
Number of observations

0.01
(0.01)

-0.074
(-0.17)

(10)

(11)

-0.632
(0.52)

0.03 -0.037
(0.22) (0.25)

Ln Property Insecurity
Max, 1985-2003
Ln Property Insecurity
Weighted, 1985-2003

Africa dummy

(9)

0.041*** 0.031***
(0)
(0)

Ln Property Insecurity
Mean, 1985-2003

Latin America and the
Caribbean dummy
Asia dummy

(8)

0.603*** 0.446***
(0.04)
(0.07)

-1.717*
(0.68)
-1.769*
(0.71)

-0.252
(0.39)
-0.252
(0.39)

-0.573
(0.58)
-0.54
(0.57)

-1.815**
(0.62)
-1.934**
(0.62)

-1.802**
(0.61)
-1.930**
(0.62)

-0.25
(0.38)
-1.795***
(0.61)
-1.917**
(0.62)

-3.073***
(0.69)
-0.754
(0.68)

-1.334**
(0.44)
-0.132
(0.32)

-1.567**
(0.57)
0.065
(0.56)

-3.272***
(0.61)
-1.017
(0.61)

-3.280***
(0.61)
-1.023
(0.61)

-3.202***
(0.6)
-1.012
(0.6)

-2.134**
(0.74)

-0.734
(0.63)

-0.836
(0.65)

-1.459
(0.91)

-1.478
(0.86)

-1.463
(0.85)

0.435
178

0.581
120

0.683
120

0.471
157

0.667
157

0
112

0.507
112

0
112

0.508
112

0.008
(0.02)

-0.016
(0.02)

0.016
110

0.497
110

-0.088
(0.07)

-0.041
(0.04)
-0.172**
(0.06)
-0.211***
(0.06)
-0.448***
(0.06)
-0.093
(0.06)
-0.162
(0.12)

0.016
108

0.674
108

Dependent Variable: HDI Score, 2005
Property Rights (ICRG),
1985-1995

0.079*** 0.047***
(0.01)
(0.01)

Property Rights (Heritage
Foundation), 1995-2004

0.005*** 0.003***
(0)
(0)

Property Insecurity Mean,
1985-2003

0.012 -0.017
(0.03) (0.02)

Property Insecurity Max,
1985-2003
Property Insecurity
Weighted, 1985-2003
Latin America and the
Caribbean dummy
Asia dummy
Africa dummy
Europe dummy
Oceania dummy
2

R
Number of observations

-0.164*
(0.07)
-0.208**
(0.07)
-0.426***
(0.07)
-0.069
(0.07)
-0.209*
(0.09)
0.613
173

-0.011
(0.07)
-0.051
(0.07)
-0.247***
(0.07)

-0.054
(0.07)
-0.079
(0.07)
-0.289***
(0.07)
0.01
(0.07)
-0.093
(0.08)

-0.007
(0.06)

-0.094
(0.094)
0.53
120

0.752

120

0.362
156

0.748
156

-0.168*
(0.07)
-0.211**
(0.07)
-0.454***
(0.07)
-0.093
(0.06)
-0.161
(0.11)
0.001
110

0.684
110

-0.171**
(0.06)
-0.212**
(0.07)
-0.456***
(0.06)
-0.095
(0.06)
-0.166
(0.11)
0.001
110

0.685
110

Notes: Dependent variables are log GDP per capita (PPP) and the Human Development Index score; Property Rights (ICRG)is the 0 to 10 scaled version
from IRIS where a higher score means more protection against expropriation; Property Insecurity Weighted is the sum of minority group insecurity
weighted by the group’s proportion of the population; Property Insecurity Max is the property insecurity score for the worst-off group in a country;
Property Insecurity Mean is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores; higher property insecurity scores indicate higher levels of
property insecurity (the inverse of the property rights indicator); the omitted continent dummy is for North America; all property insecurity scores are
logged to base e. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%,, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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The large sample of cross-country GLS regression results
displayed in Table 4 indicates that there is no relationship between the property insecurity of marginalized minority groups
and either GDP per capita or HDI. The findings here also reaffirm robust previous findings from other studies of a strong
correlation between long-run development and security of
property rights for foreign investors and domestic elites. Countries in which marginalized segments of the population suffer
from severe property insecurity often have relatively high levels of per capita income and high achievement in terms of human development outcomes, reflecting steady economic growth
rates since 1500 C.E. In other words, countries where marginalized groups experience significant property insecurity—as
measured by the risk of forced displacement and resettlement—often still experience high growth. The property insecurity of marginalized minorities does not undermine economic
development as measured by either per capita income or HDI.
However, property rights security for elites and foreign investors—and other segments of the population whose experience
with legal enforcement is adequately captured by the ICRG
and Heritage Foundation indices—does improve long-run
growth. In the relationship between property rights and longrun economic development, it fundamentally matters whose
property rights are secure. Based on the new bottom-up measure of Property Insecurity presented here, this Article finds that
although secure property rights for elites and foreign investors
are positively correlated with long-run economic development,
property rights for marginalized groups are not. Aggregate
long-run growth is not affected by property insecurity for marginalized minorities.
From an econometric standpoint, the failure to find a significant statistical relationship between Property Insecurity and
the dependent variables GDP per capita, and also between
Property Insecurity and HDI means that the standard for rejecting the null hypothesis—that there is no relationship between property insecurity and economic development—was not
met. Therefore, to avoid erroneous reliance on a “false negative,” we must assess the likelihood of a Type II error. A Type
II error occurs when the null hypothesis is not correct, but a
statistical test fails to reject it regardless. The probability of a
Type II error under the various model specifications and assumptions employed here can be evaluated according to given
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hypothesized effect size, number of variables, and sample size.
As detailed in Appendix 1, for all the empirical specifications
presented in this Article, the likelihood of a Type II error is less
than 5–10% (depending on parameter assumptions).82 Therefore, the finding of no relationship between property insecurity
and long-run growth is reliably robust.
However, as an additional robustness check on these empirical findings, this analysis utilizes the limited sample83 and reproduces the ordinary least squares specification presented by
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (“AJR”)84 in their wellknown paper, which argues that institutional quality, specifically property rights security, is a fundamental determinant of
economic development.85 Findings can be directly compared by
examining the impact of Property Insecurity within the same
universe of observations and using the same regression strategy. For the AJR specification, the Property Insecurity Index covers the period 1985 to 1995—the same time frame as the
ICRG Property Rights measure initially used by AJR—and the
continent dummies, latitude control, and year for the per capita
GDP dependent variable are also the same as those used by
AJR. 86 Results in Table 5 once again indicate that there is no
relationship between property insecurity of marginalized minorities and long-run economic development.

82. The likelihood of a Type II error is less than 10% in models with a
small hypothesized effect (0.05), while for a slightly larger hypothesized effect
(0.1), the likelihood falls to 5% or less.
83. The AJR base sample is limited to sixty-four ex-colonies for which data
is available on settler mortality. Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1377.
84. Id. at 1378; Geography and Institutions, supra note 7, at 1252, 1253.
85. Colonial Origins, supra note 2.
86. Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1378–80; Geography and Institutions, supra note 7, at 1248–49.

0.56
64

0.52
64

1.71**
(0.72)

0.49
64

0.47
64

64

-0.12***
(0.04)
-0.22***
(0.03)
0.02
(0.06)
0.76

0.06***
(0.01)

64

-0.71***
(0.24)
-0.92***
(0.17)
0.22
(0 39)
0.69

(3)
0.42***
(0.06)

64

0.76

-0.11***
(.04)
-0.22***
(0.03)
0.02 (0.06)

0.05 (0.10)

0.06***
(0.01)

64

0.98
(0.64)
-.65***
(0.24)
-0.88***
(0.17)
0.10
(0 39)
0.71

0.00
53

53

0.21

3.55***
(0.97)

0.18
(0.61)

(6)

53

-0.75**
(0.32)
-1.39***
(0.23)
1.24**
(0 57)
0.50

0.40
(0.50)

(7)

53

2.00**
(0.81)
-.64**
(0.31)
-1.27***
(0.23)
0.88
(0 56)
0.56

0.37
(0.47)

(8)

53

0.001

-0.08
(0.32)

(9)

53

0.15

0.51***
(0.17)

0.002
(0.11)

53

-0.12**
(0.05)
-0.29***
(0.03)
0.17**
(0.08)
0.66

0.05 (0.71)

53

0.20*
(0.12)
-0.11**
(0.05)
-0.28***
(0.03)
0.14
(0.08)
0.68

0.04
(0.070)

53

0.0002

0.005
(0.06)

Dependent Variable: HDI Score, 1995-2000

0.0005
(0.12)

53

0.001

0.17
(0.68)

(5)

53

0.15

0.51***
(0.17)

0.01
(0.05)

53

0.21

3.55***
(0.97)

-0.06
(0.29)

(10)

0.21* (0.12)

-0.04 (.04)

53

2.02**
(0.80)
-.60*
(0.31)
-1.31***
(0.23)
0.72
(0 57)
0.56

-0.23
(0.24)

(12)

53

53

-0.11**
-0.10**
(0.05)
(0.05)
-0.30***
-0.28***
(0.03)
(0.03)
0.15*
0.11 (0.08)
(0.08)
0.66
0.68

-0.04
(0.04)

53

-0.71**
(0.32)
-1.43***
(0.24)
1.09*
(0 58)
0.50

-0.22
(0.25)

(11)

Table 5. AJR Sample: OLS Regressions of Long-Run Development
Dependent Variable: Log per capita GDP, 1995
(4)
0.40***
(0.06)

53

0.02

0.08
(0.08)

53

0.003

0.18
(0.46)

(13)

53

0.17

0.08
(0.07)
0.51***
(0.17)

53

0.21

0.15
(0.41)
3.55***
(0.97)

(14)

53

-0.13***
(0.04)
-0.31***
(0.04)
0.13
(0.08)
0.67

-0.08
(0.05)

53

-0.78**
(0.31)
-1.56***
(0.26)
0.93
(0 58)
0.52

-0.60
(0.38)

(15)

53

-0.08
(0.05)
0.20*
(0.12)
-0.12**
(0.04)
-0.30***
(0.04)
0.09
(0.08)
0.69

53

-0.59
(0.36)
2.00**
(0.79)
-.68**
(0.30)
-1.44***
(0.25)
0.58
(0 57)
0.58

(16)
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Notes: Dependent variables are log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 and the Human Development Index score from 1995 to 2000; property rights (ICRG) is the 0 to 10 scaled version used by Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002) where a higher score means more protection against expropriation; property insecurity weighted is the sum of minority group insecurity weighted by the group’s proportion of the population;
property insecurity max is the property insecurity score for the worst-off group in a country; property insecurity mean is the unweighted average of group property insecurity scores; higher property insecurity scores
indicate higher levels of property insecurity (the inverse of the ICRG Property Rights indicator); the omitted continent dummy is for America; base sample includes countries with data for settler mortality and all
variables; all property insecurity scores are logged to base e. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%,, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

R
Number of observations

2

“Other” continent dummy

Africa dummy

Property Rights (ICRG),
0.09*** 0.08***
1985-1995
(0.12)
(0.01)
Property Insecurity
Weighted, 1985-1995
Property Insecurity Max,
1985-1995
Property Insecurity Mean,
1985-1995
Latitude
0.21
(0.14)
Asia dummy

R
Number of observations

2

“Other” continent dummy

Africa dummy

Asia dummy

Property Rights (ICRG),
1985-1995
Property Insecurity
Weighted, 1985-1995
Property Insecurity Max,
1985-1995
Property Insecurity Mean,
1985-1995
Latitude

(1)
(2)
0.52*** 0.46***
(0.06)
(0.07)
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The AJR87 article is well-known not for its finding of a simple
correlation between expropriation risk and per capita income,
as such a correlation could be explained by reverse causality
and omitted variables, but for its creative use of settler mortality as an instrumental variable to predict institutional quality
in an attempt to avoid endogeneity problems.88 Arguing that
low settler mortality rates and sparse pre-colonial populations
encouraged settlers to replicate European institutions with
strong private property rights and checks against government
power—while colonial disease environments and factor endowments favoring the establishment of extractive industries
generated higher degrees of inequality, less accountable political institutions, and ultimately less secure property rights for
the majority of the population—AJR89 found a strong and significant relationship between settler mortality and the ICRG
Property Rights indicator.90
As another additional robustness check on the new empirical
findings presented here, this Article also re-estimates AJR’s
instrumental variable model, substituting Property Insecurity
as the property rights measure. Again, the results confirm our
findings. For almost all specifications, the first-stage relationship between settler mortality and property rights disappears
when any measure of Property Insecurity is used, and in the
models where the relationship is statistically significant, the
sign is the opposite of what the expectation would be if low set87. Colonial Origins, supra note 2.
88. See id. at 1373. For critiques of this instrumental variable strategy, see
generally David Albouy, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:
An Investigation of Settler Mortality Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working
Paper
No.
14130,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14130.pdf (disputing the validity of the settler
mortality data); John McArthur & Jeffrey Sachs, Institutions and Geography:
Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) 10 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8114, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8114.pdf (arguing that settler mortality fails to
meet the exclusion restriction because disease environment impacts development directly); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth? 26
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10568, 2004), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10568.pdf (contending that education and
culture drive development rather than institutions and the density of European settlement is correlated with these factors).
89. Colonial Origins, supra note 2, at 1370–71.
90. See generally Colonial Origins, supra note 2.
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tler mortality rates indeed facilitated the widespread enjoyment of property rights. Results are shown in Appendix 2 (Table 6, Panels C–E). Stated succinctly, there is no relationship
between Property Insecurity and settler mortality. This finding
reaffirms our previous findings that the indices commonly used
to measure property rights security do not reflect the property
rights enjoyed or not enjoyed by marginalized groups: if they
did, then settler mortality would also predict Property Insecurity (with the opposite sign). This finding also calls into question
the validity of settler mortality as an instrumental variable for
secure property rights, as utilized by AJR, since theoretically if
settler mortality is operating through the mechanism AJR posits, then it should also predict Property Insecurity.
Taken together, these empirical results confirm that the relationship between property rights and economic development
depends on whose property rights are secure, and that the security of property rights for marginalized minorities is irrelevant for long-run economic growth. Growth can occur when the
property rights of elites and foreign investors are secure but
vulnerable minorities face a high risk of expropriation.
This can be understood given the dual theoretical framework
discussed above in Part II.A, which identifies both the micro
and macro mechanisms through which secure property rights
facilitate economic development. From a micro perspective,
long-run growth may be possible in a country despite property
insecurity for marginalized groups because resources are being
reallocated into the hands of investors with better access to
complementary production inputs. From a macro perspective, if
one pathway through which secure private property rights
leads to economic growth is by increasing government accountability, then the findings presented here indicate that a more
nuanced understanding of the role played by private property
rights in constraining the power of elites is required. Since the
ICRG index measures the security of property of elites and
large investors, while the Property Insecurity Index is sensitive
to the risk of expropriation faced by less powerful ethnocultural
minorities, one might predict that Property Insecurity would be
a more appropriate proxy for constraints on elites than the
ICRG measure. However, the absence of a relationship between
Property Insecurity and long-run economic growth indicates
that secure property rights for ethnocultural minorities are not
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necessary for the kind of government accountability that incentivizes the adoption of growth-enhancing economic policies.
C. Historical and Contemporary Case Studies
Heterogeneity in property rights security, as well as the complex relationship between secure property rights and economic
development, is also evident historically. The enclosure of the
commons in seventeenth century Britain—broadly acknowledged to have reduced overgrazing and increased agricultural
investments on newly enclosed land—improved the property
rights security of landed elites but eroded the property rights of
small and medium cottagers who previously had rights to the
newly enclosed commons.91 Increasing the security of private
property rights for the gentry required expropriating the property of small-hold farmers and pastoralists. The criminal law of
eighteenth century Britain operated explicitly to strengthen
the property rights claims of landed elites and to erode customary use rights traditionally enjoyed by yeomen. The Black Act
of 1723 created fifty new capital offenses punishable by hanging, directed at “crimes” that had previously been understood
as customary use, such as deer stealing, breaking the heads of
fishponds, and cutting down young trees.92 The complex web of
usufruct rights in the forest—in which the rights to harvest
trees and berries, hunt deer, and clear land for agriculture
were shared among many parties and determined by season
and status93—was crystallized into clear-cut freehold titles that
vested in the landed gentry.94 By redefining crimes as an offense against property, rather than against another person, the
Black Act allowed law to cloak itself in impartiality—masking
the power relations underlying the allocation and enforcement
of property rights entitlements.95 Here, greater property rights
91. See YELLING, supra note 3, 46–70.
92. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT
270–77 (1975).
93. For the canonical description of the progression of Western law from
status to contract, see HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS
CONNECTION TO THE HISTORY OF EARLY SOCIETY 319 (10th ed. 1861) (“Not
many of us are so unobservant as not to perceive that in innumerable cases
where old law fixed a man’s social position irreversibly at his birth, modern
law allows him to create it for himself by convention . . . .”).
94. THOMPSON, supra note 97, at 270–77.
95. Id.
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security for some actors entailed greater property insecurity for
others.
Likewise, the dispossession of Native Americans from their
land was a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of large
plantations and the widespread establishment of small freehold
farms for white settlers throughout the United States in the
first two centuries of the nation’s history. Approximately
100,000 Native Americans had their eastern homelands seized
during the nineteenth century.96 The Cherokee, Chickasaw,
Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole suffered wholesale legal expropriation and were forcibly removed to marginal land by the Indian Removal Act of 1830.97 Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830; by 1840, over 50,000 Native Americans had
been forcibly relocated from the American Southwest, opening
twenty-five million acres for settlement.98 Later, fourteen thousand Cherokee men, women, and children were marched overland, at gunpoint, by the U.S. Army in the summer of 1938.
Four thousand died from inclement weather, mistreatment by
soldiers, inadequate food, and disease.99 The widely lauded secure private property rights enjoyed by yeoman American
farmers in the nineteenth century100 were made possible by the
property insecurity of Native Americans.
Brazil is a contemporary example of a dynamic, rapidly growing upper middle income country with a high level of property
insecurity for marginalized groups. But Brazil also has strong
property rights protections for a broad cross-section of citizens,
particularly elites and foreign investors. Brazil’s GDP per capita in 2005 was $8,505 and its growth rate reached 7.5% in
2010.101 Its most recent ICRG Property Rights Security score
96. Russell Thornton, Cherokee Population Losses during the Trail of
Tears: A New Perspective and a New Estimate, 31 ETHNOHISTORY 289, 289
(1984).
97. Indian Removal Act of 1830, 25 U.S.C. 1988 § 174 (1830).
98. Thornton, supra note 101, at 289; Leonard A. Carlson & Mark A. Roberts, Indian Lands, “Squatterism,” and Slavery: Economic Interests and the
Passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, 43 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 486
(2006).
99. Thornton, supra note 101, at 291–92, 297.
100. Institutions, supra note 21; Inequality, supra note 21, at 52–53, 59–60.
101. International Human Development Indicators, United Nations Development Programme,
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/display_cf_xls_indicator.cfm?indicator_
id=20206&lang=en (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
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was in the top half globally at 7.9—higher than the world mean
of 7.06—while its Property Insecurity scores for the same period
were also both in the upper fiftieth percentile. Brazil currently
gathers approximately 90% of its energy from hydroelectric
power—a production structure that requires the construction
and operation of hydroelectric dams for continued growth.102
Since 1985, 50,000 indigenous and local residents have been
displaced and resettled due to dam construction, with a majority of resettled households left worse-off than they had been prior to dam construction.103 In 2010, the Brazilian government
approved construction of the world’s third largest hydroelectric
power plant on the Xingu River, a large tributary of the Amazon. Projected to generate 11,000 megawatts, the Belo Monte
dam will provide power for Brazil’s fast-growing economy while
displacing approximately 20,000–40,000 indigenous Amazonian
Indians.104
CONCLUSION
The history of economic development on every continent is
rife with examples of the role played by power in determining
whose property rights are made secure and insecure under de
facto legal institutions, and the considerable heterogeneity of
property rights security enjoyed by different groups in the
same country. Economic growth has often involved the expropriation of property from marginalized groups and the reallocation of these valuable resources into the hands of more politically powerful constituencies with access to the knowledge and
capital necessary for efficient use and investment.
Property rights are complex in both legal content and political and economic meaning; they are not a traffic light along a
one-dimensional continuum of “strong” to “weak.” The heterogeneity of property rights enjoyment—widely recognized by
contemporary legal scholars working in the domestic context—
has been inadequately considered in recent cross-country international and comparative property rights research. Property
rights have instead often been conceptualized in a formal rather than a realist framework, based on the implicit assump102. PBS, supra note 3.
103. THAYER SCUDDER, THE FUTURE OF LARGE DAMS: DEALING WITH SOCIAL,
ENVIRONMENTAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND POLITICAL COSTS 58–62 (2005).
104. PBS, supra note 3.
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tion that rights enjoyment is uniform across a society. The
cross-national indices of property rights widely used in the
cross-country research literature—initially designed to assess
the risk of expropriation faced by international businesses—fail
to adequately account for the institutional framework encountered by marginalized minority groups. In fact, as this Article
shows, members of marginalized groups often face significantly
higher property insecurity than foreign investors and domestic
elites. In many countries, strongly secure property rights for
some coexist alongside insecure property rights for others.
Understanding the role played by property rights in economic
development requires nuanced attention to this complex heterogeneity in property rights enjoyment. Although it has been
widely argued that secure private property rights are a prerequisite for economic development, it actually matters whose
property rights are secure. When heterogeneity in property
rights enjoyment is considered, the findings presented here
demonstrate that property insecurity of marginalized minorities does not necessarily reduce long-run economic development.
These findings are thought-provoking as they challenge widely held assumptions regarding the relationship between property rights and economic development. At a micro level, growth
can occur when property rights are broadly secure but marginalized minorities face a high risk of expropriation, because resources may be reallocated into the hands of investors with access to knowledge, capital, and other complementary production inputs. And at a macro-level, secure property rights for
marginalized minorities are not required to incentivize governments to adopt broadly growth-enhancing economic policies,
as security of property rights for elites can increase accountability of governing elites towards other elites with divergent
interests, while broad but not universal property rights security can generate accountability of public officials to the majority.
The practical implications of these findings push in two directions. On the one hand, if aggregate economic growth is the objective, then policymakers may wish to ignore (or encourage)
the expropriation of land and resources from marginalized
groups, and the reallocation of these resources into the hands
of more productive investors. On the other hand, if broadly inclusive economic development that reduces poverty and socioeconomic exclusion is the central policy objective, then atten-
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tion must be paid to distributional consequences—meaning
that summary country-level measures such as growth, income
per capita, and HDI are incomplete and sometimes inappropriate indicators.
The relationship between distributional issues and poverty
reduction has generally been examined with reference to “vertical” income inequality, which represents the distribution of
income among households and individuals. The links between
growth, inequality, and poverty reduction have been extensively explored over the past two decades.105 As a result of this research, there is a broad consensus on two stylized facts.106
First, aggregate economic growth is critically important for
poverty reduction. Historically, countries that have experienced
the longest and most consistent periods of economic growth
have likewise seen the greatest reduction in poverty; and richer
countries generally have substantially lower poverty rates than
do poor countries. Second, all other factors held constant, lower
initial levels of inequality and more progressive changes in income distributions promote poverty reduction. In two countries
that experience the same growth rates, the country that began
with a more equal distribution of income will see a greater reduction in poverty, and poverty will fall faster in countries
where the rate of growth for the poor is faster than the rate of
growth for the non-poor.107 Stated succinctly, changes in poverty can be related to changes in mean income, and changes in
relative incomes.
The challenge from a policy perspective arises if there are
trade-offs between pro-growth and pro-redistributive polices.
When should a government pursue a set of policies that would
promote high growth rates, but at the cost of increasing inequality or eroding the incomes of some of the poor while raising
the incomes of others? When might a government want to pursue pro-redistributive policies that hurt aggregate growth? Answering these questions requires a clear normative framework
regarding policy objectives: is the goal a reduction in the pov-

105. See J. Humberto López, Chapter 4: The Relative Roles of Growth and
Inequality for Poverty Reduction, in POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH:
VIRTUOUS AND VICIOUS CIRCLES 57 (Guillermo E. Perry et al. eds., 2006).
106. Id. at 70–71.
107. See generally, id.
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erty headcount,108 a reduction in the severity of poverty for the
poorest, higher incomes for the majority, or improvement in
some other measure of well-being, and over what time horizon?
Answering this question also requires contextually specific data and empirical analysis that would allow reliable predictions
regarding the growth elasticity of poverty109 and likely distributional and growth effects of a given basket of policies.
This line of research on inequality, growth, and poverty provides an analogous framework to the challenge presented here
by a similarly complex dynamic between property rights security for marginalized groups, property rights security for more
politically powerful constituencies, and economic growth. Given
the possibility of trade-offs between property rights security for
marginalized groups and aggregate economic growth, when
would a government prioritize one over the other? Again, answering this question requires a clear normative framework.
Are secure property rights an end-in-themselves, regardless of
any effects on economic outcomes, as a rights-based framework
would suggest?110 Or are secure property rights justified and
justifiable only on social welfare grounds?111 If the latter, what
are the objectives the government is seeking to maximize (reducing the absolute number of poor, reducing the severity of
poverty for the poorest, improving social and economic inclusion of marginalized groups, raising the incomes of the majority, increasing aggregate economic growth, etc.)? And, in a given
country context, what is the empirically projected relationship
between policies and these outcomes?
One implication is clear, however: aggregate economic growth
does not necessarily mean inclusive economic development.
Those with the least power and voice may be left out and left
behind by growth-enhancing policies that strengthen the property rights of those with access to capital and political influence
by weakening the property rights of marginalized groups. This
108. The number of people below a given poverty line, defined as $1.25 or $2
a day.
109. The growth elasticity of poverty is the percentage reduction in poverty
rates associated with a percentage change in per capita income.
110. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
111. See generally Demsetz, supra note 2; Coase, supra note 2; see also DE
SOTO, supra note 2, at 224.
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suggests that a narrow focus on aggregate economic growth—
without specific attention also to political and economic inclusion and the equitable application of the law—can exacerbate
poverty and socioeconomic exclusion and hurt the most vulnerable.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Probability of Type II Error
A Type II error occurs when a null hypothesis is false but a
statistical test incorrectly fails to reject it. The probability of a
Type II error is symbolized by β. β depends on the hypothesized
effect size (E), the number of observations (N), the number of
variables in the full model (V), the number of test variables (T),
and the α-level chosen as the cut-off of statistical significance.
Hypothesized effect size (E) is derived by comparing the hypothesized R2 of the model including the Property Insecurity
indicator with the R2 of the model including only the control
variables.
E = R2f - R2r

(2)

P(Type II Error) = β

(3)

β (E, N, V, T, α)

(4)

Figure 3 illustrates the very small likelihood of a Type II error in our regression models. The figure shows the cut-off number of observations required for Type II error likelihoods of less
than or equal to 5% (β = .05) and 10% (β = .1), for hypothesized
effects of 0.05 and 0.10, across the ranges of R2 values encountered in the large sample GLS regressions shown in Table 4, at
a significance level of α = 0.10, given our model with six variables. Because lower values of α increase the likelihood that an
econometric model will fail to reject a null hypothesis even if
false, a 10% significance level is used—the highest α-value
commonly used in the literature. Since the smaller the hypothesized effect, the larger the number of observations required to
reduce the likelihood of a false negative, small hypothesized
effects are used.
For a hypothesized effect of E = R2f - R2r = 0.1, β is less than
.05 (β < .05 ) at all relevant R2 values. For a hypothesized effect
of E = R2f - R2r = 0.05, β is less than .05 (β < .05 ) at all but the
lowest bounds of the R2 range. In other words, for all models
the likelihood of a Type II error is less than 10% at even a
small hypothesized effect, while the likelihood falls to 5% or
less for a slightly larger hypothesized effect.
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V = 6; α = 0.10
β = .05

β = .1

Hypothesized change in R2 = 0.05

Figure 3
E = R2f - R2r

N=104
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N=70

N=88

N=132

N=68

N=88

N=112

0.400 - 0.350
0.400 - 0.300
0.500 - 0.450
0.500 - 0.400
0.600 - 0.550
0.600 - 0.500
0.700 - 0.650
0.700 - 0.600

N=44

N=56

N=68

β = .05

N=28

N=36

N=44

N=52

β = .1

Hypothesized change in R2 = 0.10

N=34
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Appendix 2: Instrumental Variable Approach
The two-staged least squares estimates used by Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (“AJR”) treat property rights security,
Pi, as endogenous, and are modeled as
1st Stage:

Pi = α + βlogMi + µXi + єi

(5)

2nd Stage:

log yi = α + βPi + µXi + єi

(6)

where M is the settler mortality rate and Xi is a vector of covariates.112
AJR argue that settler mortality rates affect institutions only
through the structure of production, where high settler mortality rates favored the establishment of extensive extraction
economies that relied on concentrated capital and the employment of low-skilled workers—ultimately producing property
rights institutions that favored elites—while low settler mortality led to broadly egalitarian land distribution and small
scale self-employment, which ultimately engendered the widespread enjoyment of secure property rights.113 The theoretical
relationship underlying this instrumental variable strategy
suggests that if property security and property insecurity are
simply two sides of the same coin, settler mortality rates
should also predict the Property Insecurity of ethnocultural minorities.
However, as shown in Table 6 (Panels C–E), the first-stage
relationship between settler mortality and property rights disappears when we substitute in any measure of Property Insecurity. There is no statistically significant relationship for virtually any of the specifications, and for the two that show statistical significance of the relationship, the significance is de minimis and the sign is the opposite of what we would expect if low
settler mortality rates indeed facilitated the widespread enjoyment of property rights. Stated succinctly, there is no relationship between Property Insecurity and settler mortality.
This finding has three implications. First, it means that the
second stage relationship (Table 6, Panel A)—for Property Insecurity and log per capita GDP—is not valid, because the settler
mortality instrumental variable is not valid. Second, this find112. See generally Colonial Origins, supra note 2; Geography and Institutions, supra note 7.
113. Id.
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ing reaffirms our previous findings that the commonly used indices of the strength of property rights security do not reflect
the property rights enjoyed or not enjoyed by marginalized
groups; if they did, then settler mortality would also predict
Property Insecurity (with the opposite sign). Third, this finding
calls into question the validity of settler mortality as an IV for
secure property rights, as utilized by AJR, since theoretically, if
settler mortality is operating through the mechanism AJR posits then it should also predict Property Insecurity.
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